Abstract-In this study we produce a continuous authentication scheme for mobile devices that adjusts an adaptive threshold for touchscreen interactions based on trust in passively collected sensor data. Our framework unobtrusively compares real-time sensor data of a user to historic data and adjusts a trust parameter based on the similarity. We show that the trust parameter can be used to adjust an adaptive threshold in continuous authentication schemes. The framework passively models temporal, spatial and activity scenarios using sensor data such as location, surrounding devices, wi-fi networks, ambient noise, movements, user activity, ambient light, proximity to objects and atmospheric pressure from study participants. Deviations from the models increases the level of threat the device perceives from the scenario. We also model the user touchscreen interactions. The touchscreen interactions are authenticated against a threshold that is continually adjusted based on the perceived trust. This scheme provides greater nuance between security and usability, enabling more refined decisions. We present our novel framework and threshold adjustment criteria and validate our framework on two state-of-the-art sensor datasets. Our framework more than halves the false acceptance and false rejection rates of a static threshold system.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have become one of the most prevalent and widely used technologies of our time. Most mobile applications require and store private information about the user that could be used for malicious and fraudulent behavior if obtained by impostors. Modern devices present the option of a security mechanism such as a PIN, password or pattern. However, recent research has shown that such security mechanisms can be bypassed through a variety of forgery attacks, such as the smudge attack [1] . Furthermore, whilst these mechanisms provide a layer of device security, they do not persist for the duration of device usage meaning that once a user has been logged in there are typically no other security checks. Lastly, research has suggested that many users see a security mechanism as an inconvenience [2] and may disable the functionality entirely.
To address the issues with current mobile security mechanisms, studies propose continuous authentication (also known as active authentication) techniques [3] . Most mobile techniques for continuous authentication typically collect biometric data from the device during usage and use it to profile a user such that future data collected may be compared to the profile. The success of individual biometric modalities has resulted in studies successfully combining them to obtain improved accuracy [4] . In most schemes, data is collected either as an explicit interaction occurs (e.g.: each touchscreen swipe) or passively in the background (e.g.: location at each time interval).
Thresholds chosen in continuous authentication schemes are often based on an EER (equal error rate), the threshold at which the FAR (false acceptance rate) is equal to the FRR (false rejection rate) [3] . Several schemes do, however, present thresholds that can dynamically update but don't update in realtime [5] or lack nuance [6] . The use of passive sensor data for trust has been of interest to industry recently, with Google incorporating Smart Lock [26] into Android. As with similar studies, however, their approach lacks nuance and requires user interaction. Current research has focused very little on unobtrusively adapting the trade-off of usability and security.
In this paper the main focus is on providing a continuous authentication scheme that addresses the need for different levels of usability and security at different times. We hypothesize that by leveraging passively collected data (such as location [7] ) to dictate thresholds for interaction data (such as touch [3] ), we can dynamically adapt the confidence required from interactive continuous authentication techniques. We posit that the passive and interactive biometrics can work together in our scheme to provide more refined and nuanced decisions by adapting to the most appropriate usability and security levels for the specific scenario. We show the adaptive threshold technique improves on the state-of-the-art touchscreen authentication methods. The main contributions of this paper are:
• A novel proof-of-concept trust framework for a system employing passively collected sensor data to adapt the threshold used for authenticating interaction data providing refined usability and security. We show this can improve on the current state-of-the-art schemes.
• We propose new criteria for threshold adaption based on passively collected sensor data. We show how we adjust the threshold for interactive authentication based on the trust of sensor data. We show the accuracy enhancement and the compromise between usability and security.
• We show the robustness of our scheme against different attackers due to the unique combination of interactive and passive biometric data. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly summarise the previous work in the areas of continuous authentication, passive and interactive biometric data and threshold and trust mechanisms. Section III presents the general idea for our system and describes our unique approach. Section IV describes the experiments we performed on our system and discusses the results we obtained. Section V concludes our research and Section VI discusses the future work that can be derived from our system. II.
RELATED WORK
Continuous authentication research on mobile devices has produced a variety of different schemes. Collected modalities include biometrics that require interaction (e.g.: touchscreen gestures) and modalities that collect data passively (e.g.: accelerometer readings). The consideration between usability and security is a recognised but little focused on research area.
Interactive biometrics were used by researchers in Touchalytics [3] ; they presented one of the first continuous authentication schemes using touchscreen gestures. They used strokes from 41 different users and achieved an EER of 0% to 4% depending on the scenario. Studies [4] and [8] build on this concept presenting a dual-modality continuous authentication scheme that records touchscreen gesture and face biometrics during interaction. The authors in [4] use different classifiers in a stacked scheme achieving an EER of 3.77%. In [9] the researchers of the study introduce a continuous authentication scheme based on touchscreen gesture interactions using the notion of trust. Scores for a touchscreen gesture are used to adapt a trust score. The study shows this technique can add more nuance to systems that previously averaged a window of scores [3] . The thresholds in these interactive schemes are, however, static and don't factor in the environmental context which reduces the compromise between usability and security.
Passive biometrics build on the notion that humans are creatures of habit [10] . Such biometrics are gathered from device sensors in the background with no interaction necessary. In [11] , the scheme utilized user behavior patterns for authentication. They use time since the user last checked email and GPS location as behavioural biometrics for their study. The scores were combined and compared with a pre-defined threshold to determine whether to permit the user access. The authors in [7] use location information as the only modality to authenticate users. The study proposes a Hidden Markov Model with a marginal smoothing technique as a novel algorithm for location authentication. The results show that an EER of 20.73% can be achieved with the proposed method. However, knowledge of the genuine user routine can leave the scheme vulnerable to attack. In [12] the authors use a publicly available dataset containing passively collected GPS data, wi-fi and Bluetooth data to build a context profiling framework. The familiarity of the wi-fi and Bluetooth devices at a location are used to estimate the safety of the context. The trust in the context may be used to change the lockout time and login mechanism. The study creates algorithms to assess new context samples and reevaluate the safety of the context every 5 minutes. In their best-case scenario, the authors show that they can identify safe and unsafe contexts with an accuracy of ~85%.
Several studies use passively collected sensor to make decisions on what explicit authentication is required and when. In [13] the authors propose a multi-faceted authentication scheme that aims to enhance the user-friendliness of authentication schemes by using passive sensor data to assess what level of access should be permitted. The scheme collects gait, location and proximity data from mobile device sensors. One-class SVM learning techniques are trained on the sensor data and fused to compute a dynamic trust score on future samples. In [14] the authors propose a scheme that uses continuous biometrics to decide when user authentication is necessary. The system uses biometric data to form a trust score that is used to provide a level of access to the device. The study shows a 42% decrease in the number of times a user is required to explicitly authenticate. This scheme, does, however require off-device processing and does still have an impact on usability. The authors of [15] improve upon these results, proposing CASA (Context-Aware Scalable Authentication), a probabilistic framework that provides context-aware authentication. The scheme selects appropriate explicit authentication based on passive factors rather than authenticating users on these factors. They construct a Naïve Bayes classifier that assesses collected location and application usage patterns. The study found that they can reduce up to 68% of explicit authentications.
Passively collected sensor data has also been used in schemes to adjust their authentication threshold. The researchers in [5] collected a dataset of accelerometer, wi-fi, application, cell tower, CPU load, light, noise, magnetic field and rotation data from 7 different users. Their scheme builds profiles using probability density functions. The scheme updates the threshold for the sensor data daily. The imposter detection accuracy ranges from 53.21% to 99.44% depending on similarity with the genuine user behaviour. The study only tests their adversary experimentation using a single user, however, and the threshold adaption is too infrequent to adapt in real-time. The authentication scheme in [6] models data collected from user behavior event behavior to determine a level of trust on the current user. The scheme uses SMS, call, browser and Wi-Fi data. It is one of the first schemes to experiment with an adaptive threshold that updates in real-time. The adaptive threshold is computed using a function based on past the EPWA (exponentially weighted average) of previous scores.
Some studies have combined interactive and passive biometrics such as in [16] where the authors use stylometry, application usage, web browsing, and GPS location biometrics. The scores for each modality are weighted and combined periodically. The scheme achieves an EER of 5% when sampling sensors for a period of 1 minute. In SenGaurd [17] the authors propose, but do not implement, a scheme using interactive and passive biometrics including touchscreen gestures, microphone, GPS, cellular tower, and motion sensors.
Whilst some of these discussed studies assess the security and efficiency tradeoffs very few discuss the importance of the usability and security as in [18] . We find the need for continuous authentication schemes to present an adaptive compromise between usability and security.
III. ADAPTIVE THRESHOLD FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the novel framework that forms our continuous authentication system with adaptive thresholds based on passive sensor trust. We describe the general concept, our custom data capture application, how we model the different data collected, the classification setup we construct for our approach and our technique and criteria for threshold selection.
A. General Idea
This study introduces an extendable and novel framework for continuous authentication that adapts the threshold required from touchscreen gesture interactions based on passive sensor trust. We hypothesize that adapting a threshold based on sensor data can adjust the usability and security based on the user scenario and therefore yield more accurate and meaningful authentication scores as a result.
Our proposed framework continuously collects readings from a set of mobile device sensors as well as collecting the touchscreen gestures performed. The sensor readings are used to form a set of anchors. Anchors, introduced in [5] , describe a specific scenario (e.g.: an hour of the day) and models the expected characteristics of it. Each anchor contains probabilistic models for each sensor, other than any sensor used to define the anchor. These anchors create a user profile for a user over a training phase. Touch interactions collected during the training phase are used to train a classifier. After the training phase is complete, future collected readings from the sensors for each time period p are compared to the corresponding models within the appropriate anchors. This yields a score for each of the sensors from each anchor for the readings collected during that time period. We use a period of 1 minute of sensor readings in our study. Each sensor score represents the likelihood of the sensor readings belonging to the genuine user.
The score values obtained from all sensors are then combined using to form a single score that represents the trust T at time tn.
Every time the trust score is updated it is used to adapt a base threshold within computed boundaries. The adapted threshold is used for authenticating touchscreen gesture scores. High trust scores imply lower perceived threat and therefore the threshold is lowered resulting in greater usability. Low trust scores imply higher perceived threat and therefore the threshold is heightened resulting in greater security. Each subsequent touchscreen interaction after the training phase has features extracted and passed to a classifier. The classifier produces a score that is compared to the current adapted threshold. We show the process of our proposed framework in Figure 1 .
B. Data Capture
To collect the data required for authentication we design a data collection application for the Android mobile platform. We use Android in our study because it is a widely used mobile operating system and also provides considerable freedom to access device features and functionality (such as sensor readings) through APIs. Our application is set to start immediately on boot and collect data passively in the background with no user interaction required. Collected sensor data is written to the internal device storage.
Our application collects data readings from the accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, proximity, ambient lighting, gravity, and pressure sensors every 50 milliseconds. Wi-fi, Bluetooth, cellular, user activity and GPS readings are also captured, when available, each minute. We construct a touchscreen gesture collection module that runs alongside our sensor collection processes. This module runs in the background passively recording all features of all touchscreen gestures made on the device. Each touchscreen gesture is comprised of individual touch points that denote a change in the x or y of the touchscreen gesture. We make it clear that our application can collect data in all scenarios and does not need interaction with a custom application like in [3] . As in [19] , we interact with the lower-level Linux kernel to record touch data due to Android security limitations.
C. User Profiles
We use data collected over a training period to build models that describe the user. In our experimental framework, we use 10 days of previously collected data as we find this to be detailed enough for convergence between days. As the sensor readings are collected during the training period they contribute toward building a set of probability density functions for each different sensor, sn, for each of the current anchors, ‫ܣ‬ , where a is the current scenario for the anchor and j is the anchor type. We use temporal and spatial anchors represented by each hour and each cell tower reading, respectively (as in [4] ), as well as an activity anchor that we introduce to allow probability density functions to describe expected sensor readings when the user is carrying out an identifiable activity (e.g.: walking). Separate probability density functions are constructed for each attribute of a sensor with multiple attributes (e.g.: x, y and z axes for accelerometer). Probability density functions are created using histograms for discrete data and kernel density estimation models (KDEs) for continuous data. The benefits of such probability density functions include the low computational cost of updating them, allowing for future adaptability We use 5-fold cross validation on the sensor training data to calculate a set of folded genuine scores for each sensor in each anchor for a user. We use these scores, scrf, to compute an appropriate minimum expected score, ‫ܿݎݏ‬ , for each sensor a factor, c, (between 0 and 1) below the mean as in Equation 1 .
The framework for our proposed adaptive threshold scheme. The symbol pdf represents a probability density function which scores sensor sn readings for an anchor An,n producing a score snsrc.
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Deviations above or below this minimum score from subsequent sensor scores at time t, scrt, are scaled such that they provide a score scrscl between -1 and 1. Scaled scores form a trust score to increase or decrease the touchscreen gesture threshold. We use the expected minimum score ‫ܿݎݏ‬ as well as the average deviation of the folded scores scrf in our computation. We show our method for this in Equation 2.
Scores obtained from sensor readings for anchors using this scheme, denoted as ‫ܿݎݏ‬ ೕ ೌ ௦
, are combined to form the trust score T using Equation 3.
The touchscreen gestures captured over the training period for each user are pre-processed to generate a well-known feature set [3] . To collect detailed data from a touch event we discard any touchscreen gesture less than 8 touch points. The touch-gestures for the users are used to train a continuous touchscreen gesture classification scheme, following state-ofthe-art approaches.
D. Threshold Adaption
One of the key novelties of our scheme compared to other approaches that use passive and interactive biometrics [16] is that we use the passive sensor biometrics to adapt a threshold for the interactive biometrics. We compute a base threshold by using 5-fold cross validation to generate scores for the touchscreen gesture training data of all users such that we can find the threshold, thr, at the EER (when FAR=FRR). We compute upper, u, and lower, l, boundaries that govern the maximum and minimum values the adapted threshold can take. These are calculated based on the average deviation of the cross-validated scores from the threshold obtained at the EER, as in Equations 4 and 5.
As defined, the sensor trust is represented as a value between -1 and 1 (where 1 is the highest trust). This used to create an adapted threshold from sensor readings periodically. Equation 6 calculates the adapted threshold, adpt:
Such an equation ensures that when the trust level is negative due to mistrust the threshold is increased (enhancing security) and is decreased when the trust level is positive due to trust (enhancing usability).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our adaptive framework through experimentation. We discuss the datasets we used in our study and the pre-processing techniques we use to extract discernable features for system users. We then discuss the experiments we perform with on our system to assess the accuracy and robustness.
A. Datasets
To test our hypothesis and verify the validity of our results, we use two different datasets. Each dataset comprises of information from a variety of mobile device sensors.
MSC (Mobile Sensor Collection) Dataset:
To model passive sensor data in this study we produce and use our own MSC dataset. We produced this dataset because we feel it uniquely combines all sensors that have been show to previously yield identifying information. The dataset contains sensor readings from 6 different participants. Each participant used a Nexus 4 device installed with our custom data collection application, discussed in Section III, as their main device for a minimum of 14 days. Our dataset provides passively collected sensor readings from the accelerometer, Bluetooth, GPS, gravity, gyroscope, light, magnetometer, noise, cellular tower, proximity, wi-fi, activity and pressure sensors. The dataset also includes all touchscreen interactions performed by the participants. The information collected from each sensor (including types of activity) is detailed in Table 1 . Our dataset is uniquely detailed in that it contains more than 10GB of sensor data and more than 3,000 touch-gestures for each user. GCU (Glasgow Caledonian University) Dataset: The GCU dataset [5] contains sensor data from their staff and students. The dataset was collected via their custom Android application and comprises of sensor readings from light, wi-fi, application usage, cellular tower, noise and system statistics. The data is collected from each user for a minimum of 14 days. The publicly available dataset that is used in this study contains data from 4 users. The information collected from each sensor is detailed in Table 1 . The dataset contains between 190MB and 670MB for each participant depending on the duration of the data collection period.
B. Pre-processing
We extract all strokes with a length of 8 touch points or above for each user from the touch data. In [3] , a set of identifying features were successfully extracted from the raw data. We adopt and compute 29 of these features for each stroke. Descriptions of the features extracted are provided in Table 2 .
We process the sensor files for each user, reducing the sample rate of continuously updated sensors to 500ms rather than 50ms. We do this because our tests found little improvement when comparing the two sampling rates due to the system taking an average of values over a 1 minute time period to obtain a score. The decrease in sampling yields significant efficiency improvements.
C. Evaluation Metrics
As is common in biometric studies, we assess the effectiveness of our system by using the following metrics:
i 
D. Accuracy, Usability and Security
In this experiment, we evaluate the improved accuracy of our adaptive framework system compared to a state-of-the-art continuous authentication method. We perform these experiments on both sensor datasets and include all of the participants in each experiment.
For both the MSC dataset and the GCU dataset we build user profiles using sensor data over a 10-day training phase. We construct the KDEs and histograms for temporal and spatial anchors discussed in Section III. We then build the touchscreen gesture classification part of our scheme. We base our approach on the single classifier scheme in in [4] . We therefore use a Random Forest [20] classifier from the Weka API [21] because it was shown to yield the best results for gesture classification. We train the classifier on 10 days of touchscreen gestures. The positive class contains the genuine user gestures and the negative class contains the gestures of every other user. The GCU dataset does not contain touchscreen gestures. We therefore randomly assign each user in the GCU dataset with a touchscreen gesture collection from our dataset so we can use it in our scheme. We compute a static threshold by using 5-fold cross validation on the training data and selecting the threshold at the EER.
Each trained profile from a dataset is then tested by processing the next 4 remaining days of sensor and touchscreen gesture data of the genuine user and each impostor user in the current dataset. This results in our framework producing a score for each of the touchscreen gestures observed in the test set that is measured against an adapting threshold at the time the interaction was performed. In the GCU dataset the touchscreen gestures do not correspond to a specific threshold at a time in the sensor dataset because they were not collected together, unlike the MSC dataset, so we therefore select an adapting threshold at a random time for the touchscreen gesture. We also perform the same experiment without our adaptive threshold scheme such that the classifier scores are matched against the static threshold obtained at the point of EER.
For each user, we record the number of falsely accepted and falsely rejected touchscreen gestures so that we can compute FAR and FRR values. We present the results of this experiment in Table 3 . We observe that for our adaptive threshold scheme the false acceptance and false rejection rates are lowered for all users in all datasets compared to the static threshold scheme.
E. Activity as an Anchor
We experiment with using the detected activity of a user as an additional anchor. Sensor readings taken during a specific activity (e.g.: walking) are compared to the probabilistic models for that activity anchor. We repeat the previous experiment, this time including the activity of a user as an anchor. We only perform this experiment using the MSC dataset because the GCU dataset does not include user activity.
We find that scores from activity anchors for continuous sensors (such as accelerometer) prove unreliable and sporadic. We explain this due to the limited number of only 8 activities and therefore a saturation of different sensor readings for each. This experiment therefore uses only Bluetooth, wi-fi and celluar tower sensor data. We show the results of this experiment in Table 4 . Comparing these results to the results in Table 3 , that were achieved with only temporal and spatial anchors, we find that the addition of an activity anchor improves the average FAR and FRR. We can therefore infer that sensor readings during a particular user activity can reveal telling information and contribute toward authenticating a user. We show the effectiveness of our adaptive threshold scheme using all 3 anchors in Figure 2 . The adaptive nature of the threshold can clearly be seen to decrease the threshold (enhancing usability) in known environments and increase the threshold (enhancing security) in unknown environments.
F. Attack Scenarios
In this experiment, we show how our system can achieve results improving on techniques that use only static thresholds or passive sensor data. We explore attacks carried out by informed and uninformed attackers [22] . This experiment uses all 3 anchors for MSC dataset users.
The uninformed attacker is the most common class of attacker. This attacker represents an individual that has no knowledge of the authentication scheme on the device or the Figure 2 : Graphs when a trained adaptive threshold scheme is tested on a genuine and impostor user data from the MSC dataset. The graphs depict the scores of touchscreen gestures as black dots, the dynamic threshold as a red line, and the static threshold (achieved at EER) as a blue line. Table 4 : The FARs and FRRs we achieved (as percentages) when using our adaptive threshold scheme using a third anchor representing user activity on the MSC dataset.
way in which the genuine user uses the device; they can be thieves who take a device from a user and begin using it with no additional security concern. We therefore need to model a case where the device is taken from a user. We achieve this by taking a study device away from the proximity of 3 participants (Users 2, 3 and 4) in the MSC dataset after their data collection period. We replicate the previous experiment for these 3 users and attempt to gain access to the trained system using impostor touchscreen gestures after the point at which the device was taken. We observe that when the device leaves the possession of the genuine user the adaptive threshold scheme responds within 60 seconds to increase the threshold required to authenticate touchscreen gestures. The fast response of our scheme to raise the threshold leaves little room to carry out attacks at lower thresholds. Figure 3 shows the point at which an impostor takes the phone and the subsequent increase of the adaptive threshold. We see the adaptive threshold requires a higher score than the static threshold when a device is taken; indicating our solution is more robust. We show FARs for the adaptive and static threshold schemes for the 3 users in Table 5 .
An informed attacker is difficult to detect because they have familiarity with the environment in which the genuine user uses the device and the way in which they use it. We perform this experiment on both MSC and GCU datasets. The model is trained for each user within a dataset. We are then able to test the trained scheme on genuine user sensor data and the touchscreen gestures from all other dataset users to simulate impostors using the device of the genuine user in a known environment. We observe that the trusted sensor data lowers threshold and heightens the FAR. However, due to our nuanced scheme we find that the majority impostor touchscreen gestures are still below the lower boundary for the threshold. We find our novel scheme using touchscreen gestures improves upon the FAR for informed attackers achieved by studies authenticating using only sensor data. The results for this experiment are shown in Table 6 .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel mobile continuous authentication framework that compromises between usability and security by using passively collected sensor readings to adapt the threshold for touchscreen gesture authentication. We describe our framework and the methods for threshold adaption. We collected our own experimental dataset for the study consisting of detailed sensor data and touchscreen gestures. We show that our framework can improve on the state-of-the-art static threshold schemes when authenticating different users. We show that our scheme can offer additional robustness when detecting impostor users that have stolen the device. We argue that our scheme provides a better compromise between usability and security than other state-of-the-art continuous authentication schemes.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The future work of this research will concentrate on furthering this framework by addressing its current limitations. Firstly, we will explore how to better combine the sensor scores and anchors. We will endeavor to investigate the contributions of each sensor and each anchor toward the final trust score. This will enable us to apply weightings to each sensor and anchor such that they contribute to the final score in the most effective and reliable way. Using the sensor data collected we will also investigate more refined classification approaches for each sensor as [23] does for their 3 sensor datasets. We could, for example, apply techniques that look beyond noise levels but into types of noises or voices as in [24] .
The second area we intend to look into is the ability to Table 6 : The FARs (as percentages) for both the MSC and GCU datasets when emulating an informed attacker in our adaptive threshold scheme.
continually update the biometric profile seamlessly over time.
The issue of concept drift [25] is the problem of biometrics drifting from the profile over time and therefore weakening the accuracy of the biometric authentication system. We will explore techniques suitable for updating the both the passive and interactive biometric profiles of a user efficiently on mobile devices. Methods to alleviate concept drift in continuous authentication schemes is a little researched area. Finally, our future work will look into additional biometric modalities that we could add as part of this adaptive threshold scheme. We will primarily investigate what other forms of interaction we can include in our scheme in addition to touchscreen gestures. Additional interactive biometrics would allow us authenticate the user more regularly and improve the security of the scheme.
